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H

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

1ST OK CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,

)
)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Plaintiff and Appellant,
)

vs.

:
)

MORRIS H. CURTIS and SADIE
P. CURTIS, his wife; and UTAH
TITLE & ABSTxRACT CO., a Utah
corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

No. 14334

:
)
)
)

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The Plaintiff brought an action to specifically enforce
the terms of a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Defendants Curtis

counterclaimed, asking that the contract be rescinded because
of the fraudulent representations and the fraud practiced upon
them by the President of the Plaintiff Corporation.

Defendant

Utah Title and Abstract Company agreed to be bound by the order
of the Court regardless of the outcome respecting the other
parties and no other affirmative relief was asked against it.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury.

The jury entered a general

verdict and special interrogatories in favor of. the Defendants
Curtis and thereafter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment x^zas entered by the Court in favor of Defendants Curtis
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants Curtis seek to have affirmed the verdict
of the jury and the judgment of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
We do not disagree with the summary statement of
facts of appellant.

However, we believe the facts must

be supplemented to give the Court a basic understanding
of the matter.
BUSINESS EXPERIENCE AND BACKGROUND OF DEFENDANTS CURTIS
Defendant

Morris H. Curtis was a farmer (TR335)

who supplemented his income as a delivery truck driver
for Premium Oil Company (TR336).

He had very limited

business experience and had never had the services of
a lawyer (TR336).

He had never had a real estate trans-

action where he was the seller (TR336).

When he purchased

his farm property, the transaction was handled by a Sevier
County Abstracter whom he thought to be the Sevier County
Recorder (TR337).

He was never acquainted with any real

estate broker (TR337).

He does not know how to read real

estate descriptions or how to compute acreage (TR343).
Sadie P. Curtis, wife of the Defendant Morris H.
Curtis, had little formal education.

She finished the

ninth grade and then was forced to leave school because
of critical injury.

She was in a coma for a period of

-
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six months and then was blind and paralized for two
years (TR413).

She had no business experience.

When

she and her husband acquired a lot for the purpose of
building their home, they exchanged a house trailer for
it and the seller, her husband's uncle, took care of the
property transfer (TR414).

The farm purchase was handled

by a Richfield Abstracter (TR414).

She didn't know any

lawyers or any real estate brokers (TR414).

Mrs. Curtis

has health problems which place severe limitations on
her ability to transact business. She has a heart problem
and high blood pressure.

Tension or pressure or excitement

cause a complete loss of memory.
don't remember.

In her words, "I just

I just blank." (TR415).

NEED FOR ASSISTANCE AND PRELIMINARY INDUCEMENTS BY BUYER
The Curtises own 250 acres of land in Salina Canyon
which was bisected by Interstate Highway 170 and upon
which the Salina Freeway Exchange is now built (TR337).
Prior to roadway construction, the Curtises were aware
of the freeway activity and had seen surveyors on their
property (TR333).

They were aware of many problems in

developing freeway frontage and knew they were not able
to cope with them without assistance.

The Curtises knew

that they "were going to have to have some help'to
disburse of our property" (TR338) . They knei* their
property was valuable but had no idea as to the extent
•-

3
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of its value (TR338).

Orland Fiandaca, President of

the Plaintiff 1st Ok Corporation, first contacted the
Curtises in December of 1971 or early January 1972.
The exact time is in some dispute.

He spent over

five hours (TR334) telling the Curtises of the
problems in highway development and of his experience
and ability to develop highway property (TR431).

He

said his services would make them financially .
independent.

Curtises would be able to get a

condominium in Hawaii and wouldn't have to work the
rest of their lives (TR391 and TR417).

Fiandaca

informed Curtises that he was well acquainted with
the Governor of the State of Utah and the State Road
Engineer and was in close contact with them and could
get whatever easements were needed to develop all of
the Curtis property (TR342).

It was at this time

Curtises decided, "This is our man, a man who could
help us with the disbursing of our property'1 (TR341) .
Fiandaca presented to Curtises an arrangement by
which Curtises agreed to grant to 1st Ok Corporation
an option for $100.00 which would allow 1st Ok Corporation to acquire 50 acres of land for $1,000.00 per
acre.

The option was on the express condition that

Fiandaca would represent Curtises and develop their
remaining property so that it could be sold (TR391).
Curtises would not have sold the land for the price
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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mentioned without the additional consideration (TR341),
ORIGINAL CONTRACT PREPARED BY BUYER
Fiandaca then wrote the option agreement in his
own hand which tied up 50 acres of property for a
period of one year for $100.00 consideration.

Mr, .

Curtis suggested going to a lax^yer, but Fiandaca
told him he had bad experience with lawyers and
that he was capable of drawing up a contract,
Fiandaca also informed Curtises that he had a title
and trust company that would handle the matter for
them (TR342 and 343).
the title company

Mr. and Mrs. Curtis understood

ff

would be protectorsn (TR343) ,

SECOND CONTRACT PREPARED BY BUYER
After the initial option prepared by Fiandaca
was executed in December of 1971 or early January,
1972, Mr, Fiandaca came back to the Curtises on or
about January 21, 1972 and informed them that the
State Highway was going to condemn approximately 38
acres of land he had under option.

Fiandaca informed

them that this left him only about 12 acres to develop
and that he wasn't in a position to represent them in
developing their property unless additional land was
added to his contract for his benefit.

Curtises then

agreed to add an additional 20 acres to the option
agreement (TR345).

A discussion was had concerning the
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purchase price (TR391),

It was agreed that the

price would be $65,000.00 for the original 50 acres
plus 20 acres or a total of 70 acres. However,
Fiandaca wrote the new contract to include 90 acres
rather than 70 acres (TR224, 345 ? 346, 354, 368, 419
and 421).

Because of the dependency the Curtises had

on Fiandaca for services he was going to render, the
Curtises agreed to a price of $65,000.00 for the 7 0
acres (TR346 and 347).

Fiandaca then wrote the option

contract and the real estate description (TR346 and 352;
Exhibit 41).
ADDENDUM TO SECOND CONTRACT
At a later date Fiandaca contacted the Curtises
and said he had heard that they were not satisfied with
the $65,000.00 purchase price.

The Curtises informed him

that they were not satisfied because they felt they should
have $1,000.00 per acre for the land in the option agreement.

Thereafter, the option contract was amended by an

addendum to include an additional $5,000.00 for a total
purchase price of $70,000.00 (TR352 and 353).

Curtises

were never aware of the fact that the contract (Exhibit
41) included 90 acres of their land until the time of
pre-trial (TR367 and 368).

The Curtises would not have

signed the agreement if they had known 90 acres of their
land was described (TR368).
-

After the second preliminary
6 -
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contract of January 21, 1972 (Exhibit 41) was
prepared by Fiandaca in his own hand, it was
signed by all of the parties,

Thereafter

Fiandaca exercised his option and a uniform
real estate contract and trust agreement were
completed (Exhibits 41a and 42) and the Curtises
conveyed their property to Utah Title and Abstract
Company on January 3, 1973 (TR359 and 360),

The

Curtises were paid the down payment less the $100,00
option consideration which was returned to Fiandaca
as a credit on the payment (Exhibit 43),
MANAGEMENT OF PROPERTY RETAINED BY SELLERS
After receiving the down payment on the property,
the Curtises had frequent contact with Fiandaca in
which he kept them informed on what he was doing to
"manage" their property (TR347),

Mr. Fiandacafs next

payment under the contract was due January 3, 1973.
Fiandaca contacted the Curtises and requested an
extension of time for payment.

'; .

The Curtises refused

to grant the extension since they were negotiating to
buy other grazing property for their cattle (TR362 and
363),

The payment was not made.

The Curtises waited

thirty (30) days and then contacted an attorney* for
the first time. A notice of default was given pursuant
to the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract and no
-

7 -
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payment was made within the grace period (TR363,
364 and 365).

After notice of default and demand

for reconveyance (Exhibit 80) was given to Fiandaca
and the Utah Title and Abstract Company, the Utah
Title and Abstract Company refused to reconvey to
the Curtises but at the request of Fiandaca conveyed
all of the Curtis road frontage property to 1st Ok
Corporation without prior notice to Curtises (TR312,
313 and 314).

i

FACTS DISCOVERED BY DEFENDANTS CURTIS AFTER DEFAULT
IN FIRST SCHEDULED PAYMENT
Thereafter, the Curtises learned the following
facts which were never previously disclosed:
(a)

Orland Fiandaca had not described 70

acres of their property in the option contract which
he had prepared (Exhibit 41), but had inserted a
description for 90 acres (TR224, 345, 346, 354, 368,
419 and 421).
.(b). Orland Fiandaca had secured the release
of a tract of the Curtis land on December 15, 1972
and prior to execution of the uniform real estate
agreement and had sold the property for approximately
$20,000.00.

Only $10,000.00 of which was delivered

to the Curtises as the down payment (TR360).
(c) The release of that initial tract of land
landlocked property owned by Curtises to the South (TR361).
- J. RReuben-Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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(d) Fiandaca had taken out personal bankruptcy which bankruptcy proceedings were closed in
October, 1971 (TR254) a few months prior to negotiations and entering into the option agreement with
Curtises (TR194).
(e) Orland Fiandaca had previously operated
a corporation known as the Container Corporation which
had become bankrupt (TR193),
(f) The 1st Ok Corporation was organized and
the only contribution to capital was $1,000,00 and a
part of the $1,000.00 was used for organization
expenses (TR200),
(g) The 1st Ok Corporation had lost its charter
for failure to file reports and returns required by the
State of Utah (TR190, Exhibit 84),
(h) Fiandaca did not properly represent the
Curtises in negotiations with the Utah State Road
Commission or with other agencies and did not reserve
private easements which could be used to service the
remaining property retained by Curtises; specifically;
(1) Fiandaca obtained from the State Road
Commission access openings of 50 feet for property
acquired by him under the purchase agreement.

The

accesses granted to Curtises for other property owned
by them and fronting on the access road were only 16
feet in width (TR349),
-

9
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(2)

Curtises1 property remained

zoned

agricultural while Fiandaca procured a zone change for
his property to highway commercial (TR361 and 148).
(3) Under the lot release provisions in
the Fiandaca contract a selection was made of the entire
land which fronted on the highway and landlocked the
balance of the property owned by Curtises.

See Exhibit

88 (TR222).
(4) Fiandaca borrowed funds for his own
benefit on the Curtis property and executed two mortgages on Curtis land (TR233 and 368).
(5) Fiandaca sold options on parcels of
the property being acquired from Curtises and did
receive cash option consideration in excess of
$6,000.00 while he made no attempt to assist with
sales or marketing of the remaining Curtis property
(TR369 and 370).
(6) Fiandaca had negotiated with the
Utah State Road Commission and secured a payment
of $500.00 per acre on the land in which he had an
interest and identical land which was retained by the
Curtises was condemned and the Curtises were paid
$200.00 per acre (TR350 and 351).
Upon learning the true facts, the Curtises
counterclaimed against the 1st Ok Corporation to
rescind the contract because of the fraud practiced
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

upon then: by Orlaiie Fi.i--iu ~ ,

rresident of the buyer

coinp -n-i, .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Trk- IK1AL COURT CORRECTLY IMSTRLICTED ThE JURY
ON TEE TSSTr" nv CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 1
2.

' S ISSUE WAS RAISED BY THE f LEAum.S ,
* p " T D E N C E INTRODUCED DURING TRIAL
I
TflF INSTRUCTIONS TO BE GIVEN.
11* jL.SSUh' 0;' CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP • ,.
RAISED P>Y TFf^ PLEADINGS.
• ..; ;•[ (he Utah Rules of Cixn 1 p : -. -, caure

Pc;

states the requirement lor pleading a^ fojlnws-:
*\a)
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
.... pleading which
sets forth a claim for relief, whether an
original claim, cross-claim or third-party
claim, shall contain (I) a short and plain
statement or the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a
demand for judgment for the relief re which
h^ deems himself entitled."
The foregoing rn'le
on several oc^-Fs
?'

-'•. *. •

;

Iris nr».--: ! *..-. lev/cd by this Co
;;, ;„.-/-r vs, Child, 1 Utah 2d JO" ~

•• «i si wrote:

"Under the Utah Rules ol: L-ivil Procedure,
for the most part taken from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, (28 useA) a
pleader is required only to make a short
and plain statement of his claim, U.K.C.P.
Rule 8(a), and the requirement of Li •hnical
exactness is excluded. Fine detail Is not
r e q u i r e d . Porter
v\ Shoemaker,
Hickman v. Taylor , 323 U.S. 495,

D.C.,
p. r>7
6/ S.CC* 365,

j'n
388,

91 L.Ed. 451, Mr. Justice Murphy, discussing '
the Federal rules, said:
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"The pre-trial deposition-discovery
mechanism established by Rules 26 to
37 is one of the most significant
innovations of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Under the prior
federal practice, the pre-trial
functions of notice-giving, issueformulation and fact-revelation were
performed primarily and inadequately
by the pleadings. Inquiry into the
issues and the facts before trial was
narrowly confined and was often
cumbersome in method. The new rules,
however, restrict the pleadings to the
task of general notice-giving and invest
the deposition-discovery process with a
vital role in the preparation for trial."
This court also considered pleading requirements in
the c a s e of

Wilson

v s . Oldroud, 1 Utah 2d 362,

267 P.2d 759.

At

issue was the question of whether malice had been alleged
in connection with the request for punitive damage.
Justice Crockett wrote for the Court:
"Particularly under our new Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rule 8A U.R.C.P.) a statement of
ultimate fact is sufficient and it is unnecessary to set forth in detail the conduct,
the language or the artifices used to accomplish the result."
The legal term "confidential relationship" or
"trust" or "fiduciary11 or "trustee" or "constructive
trustee" are all words describing a legal conclusion
or a legal relationship which result from a certain
state of facts and from which certain legal rights
and obligations result.
American

Jurisprudence

2d.

This matter is covered in
§ 8 pleading

on page 460, w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g

in Volume 61 Am Jur

statement;
12
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2d.

M

Ii .is unnecessary to plead presumptions
of law, inferences, or facts necessarily
implied from other facts stated. A pleading which avers facts from which the law
presumes another fact sufficiently p.] cads
that other fact. Ivhat is clearly implied
is as much a part of the pleading as what
is expressed. Li ke a presumption of 1aw,
an inference need not he pleaded,"
Defendants Curtis in paia^rnpn four -;f their count; e
claim sf a ted
m a t the 1st Ox Corporation, a Utah Corporation, by and through its President.
Orland Fiandaea, falsely made the following
representations to induce Defendants to
enter into said contracts and the Defendants
reasonably relying thereon did enter into
said con tr act, whi c h misrepres en tat ions
were;
;'.r) Orland Fiaudaca, President of the
t Ok Corporation did represent that his
apany was a corporation under the laws
oi the State of Utah and was therefore a
good buyer, financially sound and able to
guarantee all of the performances and
payments due under the Uniform Real Estate
Cor:tract dated the 15th dav of December,
19'.
•
1

The 1st uk Corporation has no assets
with which to guarantee payment or performance of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract identified and as a matter of
fact has made sales -<• F parcels of
Plaintiff's property in advance for the
purpose of securing payments due
(b) Thai Orland Fiandaca, President
of 1st
Ok Corporation
informed the Defendants
thai
they
should not go to an attorney,
that, attorneys
were
expensive
and the Defendants
would be
properly
secured by the contract
which was drafted
in
accordance with his instruction
and further

that he would take the Defendants to
Utah Title and Abstract' Company,
specialists in real, property matters

l
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who would make c e r t a i n t h a t t h e
Defendants were adequately secured
and would suffer no f i n a n c i a l injury
or damage. Upon t h e inducement so
made, t h e s e Defendants did execute
t h e Trust ! Agreement attached t o
Pn l an i n t i f f s Complaint marked E x h i b i t
B and did convey t h e i r property t o
Defendant, Utah T i t l e and Abstract
Company; t h a t Utah T i t l e and Abstract
Company did not undertake t o r e p r e s e n t
t h e s e Defendants o r t o secure them from
economic or f i n a n c i a l l o s s ; t h a t i n f a c t
they only administered t h e Uniform Real
E s t a t e Contract already prepared by t h e
P l a i n t i f f which agreement permits a
s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n i n t h e value of
P l a i n t i f f ' s s e c u r i t y because p r o p e r t y can
be s e l e c t e d a t random by P l a i n t i f f and
sold t o t h i r d p a r t i e s and t h e l i m i t e d
proceeds r e q u i r e d t o be p a i d f o r p a r t i a l
r e l e a s e s a r e applied on accruing payments due under t h e c o n t r a c t ; t h e r e f o r e ,
P l a i n t i f f s e l e c t s v a l u a b l e p a r c e l s of
land and has s a i d p a r c e l s conveyed t o
s a i d t h i r d p a r t i e s and do thereby
s u b s t a n t i a l l y decrease P l a i n t i f f ' s
security interest.
(c)
Orland Fiandaca, President of Plaintiff
Corporation did represent to these Defendants that
he was an expert in developing commercial property
and that he would effectively
negotiate with the
State of Utah and all other interested persons to
make certain that adjoining property retained by
these Defendants would he substantially increased
in value; that he would see that the State of Utah
granted suitable access rights to a proposed interstate highway so that Defendants' adjoining properties
could be developed for commercial purposes.

That P l a i n t i f f has not r e p r e s e n t e d t h e s e
Defendants i n said n e g o t i a t i o n s i n any manner
or attempted t o secure access r i g h t s or
attempted t o a s s i s t t h e s e Defendants i n p l a n ning t h e i r p r o p e r t y for commercial development.
(d) That Plaintiff
through its President did
further represent that i t would reserve adequette
easements and access rights to and from the interstate highway for the benefit of Defendants' adjacent
property.
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3hat. n o attempt haa ho^u m a d e to
reserve casements and rights-of-way
f o r D e f en cl a n t s r h on e f i f
( e j , v ; a\-a Fiandaca, President
of Phj
intiff
corporation
did further
represent
to the
Defendants
that he would reserve for their benefit
nil
qas,
oil arrl mi nor cil
rights,

That in j.n.'L, the riatntiff did cause
the Defendants to convey a i l o f their g a s ,
oil and m i n e r a l rights to the trustee and
it further executed instruments conveying
g a s , o i l and mineral rights to third parties
w h o have purchased parcels o f p r o p e r t y from
the P l a i n t i f f b y reason o f the Jot release
provisions contained in E>;h"P-;'~ '"'"
Eaef of t]i(> foref.v-:;/; t;legations demonstrate that
Orland

v

Iauaae. • .

-'...*J d himself out •'•"* !

arafting legal documents

. pl^/iii.

*>:per- *n

.
- , Lianaging freeway

properties and fa •U-il-^g with real estate; Char
tnrl.'i.' d

"iy LU- ?;i aim completely'

"

Dei^aaants

•• a legal

it a strurneat anci make sueh .'Ti oigenients as w o u l d aceoirr. "-^h
their purpose: *-' -...euiii.y, property mana'-.-rndeve iop • ;•• •: o, fheir property and ..;
the Plaintiff w a s ^ s e v
pre-trial

•••!<•

• Vd :•; .

T h e r e f o r e , the- Defendants

ic-i

•:••..- .or

:.'ii.r;d p a r t i e s .

o> the Court to r-re.ov. • a

H e did not final f:-a

J*-> order.

Cur- f. .• aum.; ctcd a ore-trial

order ( R 4 J thr^upjh •'* / . r'j.o; to the trial in wh'l.-,r. t he
issues fi-ir.iM *• . r..i to £ he jury were s p e c ; d : — ; L y set out
a.- : e.. I ows ;

"^.

rla; toilowing a r e the issues of iaci
Co h o tried*

la) I;I.CI Plaintiff's President, ouxand
F i a n d a c a , induce Defendants M o r r i s ih Curtis
and Sadie P, Curtis into entering in».o the
agreement to sell their p r o p e r t y b y false
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , a n d i f s o , what w e r e those
false representations?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(b) Did Fiandaca and his corporation
or either of them hold themselves out as
being capable of performing and willing to
perform and, in fact, undertake and agree
to furnish professional and expert services
and advice in evaluating, classifying,
zoning, obtaining accesses for, marketing,
determining the accurate amount of acreage
of, offering for sale and selling real
property for commercial development and
whether or not Curtises in reliance upon
that representation and in reliance upon
Fiandaca or his corporation holding themselves out as willing and able to perform
those services relied thereupon in execution
of the several contracts and Fiandaca and his
corporation, having undertaken to do those
things and furnish that advice and services
failed to do so and thereby damaged Curtises,
(c) Did a confidential relationship
exist between Orland Fiandaca, President
of 1st Ok Corporation and Morris H, Curtis
and Sadie P. Curtis?
(d) Vlhen was the payment due from
Plaintiff on January 5, 1974, made to
Defendants, Morris H. Curtis and Sadie
P. Curtis or their agent? . , ,
6.

The following are issues of law to be
decided by the court:

(a) Have Defendants Morris H. Curtis
and Sadie P. Curtis waived any deficiences
in the time and manner of payment of the
payment due from Plaintiff on January 5, 1974?
(b) Does Plaintiff have an adequate
remedy at law, and is it entitled to specific
performance?
(c) Are Defendants Morris H. Curtis and
Sadie P. Curtis entitled to have their contract
with Plaintiff rescinded because of the fraudulent inducement of Plaintiff?
(d) Did a confidential relationship exist
between Orland Fiandaca, President of 1st Ok
corporation and Morris H. Curtis and Sadie P.
-
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Curtis and are the Curt ).;.-,*: eatitied
to have their contract with Plainrirf
rescinded because of a breech of
fiduciary trust by the Plaf r*' i f f?
i^e; Arc jjelendants Morris H. Curtis
and Sadie P. Curtis entitled to forfeit
the interest of Plaintiff in the real
property being purchased, or would such
forfeiture be unconsclonab.1 e?
Issues of fact will
be submitted to the
jury by special interrogatories and general verdict form. Counsel for Plaintiff
and Defendants Curtis will submit their
proposed special interrogatories to the
Court before 10:00 A.N on Hie raorning of
t r la!./'

7.

The prc-triaL ord;-

• ( ••-I.-L ionr:, special jury

i n f erro;rnrn - ? .;•.<; ,.,;,» general jury verdict fo "":•'• v:?re
ted to the court .'Ov? 1 • - •:!•. ,;«j i /,- the Plaintiff

:

,-D>:KL.L

prior r.n 10:00 \ A/i'
triajL.

., : . - - ; i .

theory of the case

:, .;-.-rn.Ln^ of the comnencernerL
• iijt ruments detail r-r! fh

- _•£ eziaariL^ '

P In J ni.i fr -L : . - , equest a continuance

and did elect Ln i--a .-..-.ueo !:<~; tri'il
?.

T W EVIDENCE INTRODUCED DURING TRIAL REQUIRED
TilE INSTRUCTIONS TO BE GIVEN.

We respectf^ ' J v .-.bnift ' u
the parti- •

a>

J, ojt

' : ee relationship between

by the facts ploade.

<.ia

Dei • :*u.:atrJ ii'-'iLs Count, ercla l::i • •• a -,.) specifically
set out Jn t^- ir-e- * * '
ins^"-n.'c "L- r

c-racr and the request fo;

• ,. •'• * he spec; J'^

and cr^nerai jury vordlr/ Fr^;;,

L ,r v Lot a'u _ .-• L or ies

...knitted prior fo trial.

However, we «:*' •• * he opinion Uvif: even 11 th- .-• i e,idin<*s
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had not covered the specific relationship of the
parties the facts in evidence at trial did in fact
prove a confidential relationship.

Under this

circumstance, the Court was required to submit
instructions to advise the jury on the burden
of proof on the issue of fraud.
This Court covered this question in considerable
detail in the case of

Swan1 s Estate,

In Re

4 Utah 2d

277,

293 P. 2d 682:

"Where a confidential adviser is made
the beneficiary in a will, receives
gifts or possible benefits from transactions with the person who relies on
his advice and counsel on such matter
in the making or execution of which he
actively participates, a presumption
of fraud and undue influence arises,
which shifts the burden of persuading
the trier of fact that there was no
fraud or undue influence."
This Court also stated:
"For reasons previously pointed out we
also reject the doctrine that this presumption is eliminated by a prima facie
showing to the contrary. After careful .
study and consideration we conclude that
this presumption shifts the burden onto
the confidential adviser of persuading
or convincing the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that no fraud
or undue influence was exerted, or in
other words, he had the burden of convincing the fact finder from the evidence
that it is more probable that he acted
perfectly fair with his confidant; that*
me made complete disclosure of all material information available and took no
unfair advantage of his superior position/'
-
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TP
Court

Johnson

vr,. Johnson, 9 M-V; -. -in{ ijy

P. 2d *20

the

s£ntod.

"In assaying the sufficiency of JJJUO;. , the
plaintiffs here have significant help in
the rule that when a confidential relationship is shown to exist and a ^ift or conveyance is made to a party in a superior
position, a presumption arises that the
transaction was unfair,L This presumption
has the force of evidence and will itself
support a finding if not overcome by
countervailing evidence. Therefore, the
burden was upon the defendant Calvin
Johnson to convince the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the
transaction was fair,'' If he failed to
do so, the finding to the contrary was
justified, and It will not be disturbed
on appeal unless the contrary evidence
was so clear and persuasive that all
reasonable minds would ^o find
Tiuu;e can be no doubt that the existence
of a confidential relationship here of the
very kind for which the above rule was
fashioned. The evidence shows that his
father reposed great confidence in Calvin.
This Is epitomized by his cooperating with
him in making final arrangements about his
property for the eventuality of death."
I
Tl

S T .

.":use Oi Omega Investment
y/J

,<„

/;-;7/

L(:LS

COUT?

••"

>\oollcij , 72

S il ' o ;

"The v: on f i d en t i a .1 r el a t ion be Ing s I JO wn
to e x i s t , t h e b u r d e n d e v o l v e d u p o n W o o l l e y
to s h o w t h a t , in the m a k i n g of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n , t h e f u l l e s t and f a i r e s t e x p l a n a t i o n
and c o m m u n i c a t i o n w a s m a d e to B a l d w i n o f

ovory

particular in Wool ley's breast; that

•Omega Investment

Co, vs.. Wool lay,

q u o t i n g 2 Pomerov

/2 Utah 474,

271 P.

E q u i t y J u r i s p r u d e n c e , o^c

in i.<> Jwcn:*s: U<>idtte, 4 Utah

2d 2//,

-. ••* v •, 2d GH2,

±y
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797,

956.

the transaction itself was fair, and the
consideration paid therefor adequate, before
a court is justified in permitting the trans^
action to stand.!f
The facts proved at the time of trial required the
Court to sumbit to the jury the issue of whether or not
there was a confidential relationship.

In the event the

jury found a confidential relationship did exist, the
Court was further required to instruct specifically
concerning the burden of proof required to be assumed by
the respective parties.
POINT II
DEFENDANTS CURTIS DID ALLEGE AND DID PROVE THE
ELEMENTS OF ACTIONABLE FRAUD,
Defendants Curtis did allege the essential elements
of actual fraud as specifically set forth in the Utah Case
of Pace vs. Parrish,l22

u. 141, 247 p.2d 273, The allegations are

contained in Defendants Counterclaim and in an amendment
authorized by the Court and included In the pre-trial
order.

The Plaintiff acknowledges the additional specific

claim of the Defendants Curtis which is in paragraph 2
of the pre-trial order (R.45);
"2. The Counterclaim of Defendants Morris
H. Curtis and Sadie P. Curtis is hereby
amended to show the date of execution of
the instruments described therein as January 3, 1973 and further amended to show that
Defendants allege Plaintiff
represented the property
described in the contract of January 21, 1972 included
70 acres of Curtis land which representation
was false
since the property described consisted of
approximately
- - -, M

acres."
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on

The appellant. Made ;:en T M - * !stood J'<

s

J; J . V under-

• .-roLii upon Defendants Curtis i *

connect ;.oi uith rh^ir allegation of common
i i addition 'u< :iavin;
there-.--

• •:

• -• .-U/. L :-n i\'u.

!

; •!•• fru -

. -. ru= i. sp- .ci ficaily
i.R./y), the Plaintiff

(!.•; have the Court submit i ?•" r ollowing Spev --IL
.•:::iL h w a s Plaintiff's

Interrogates • ".
: :•

.•!•;•.•. Ll-.'J

l.:i

; L i' U C L

1 U ;J

i\\ •

"We llu jury, find iru;;; a preponderance
of the evidence 1 in this case the following
answers to •• f;- Muestlons propounded !o u s ;
Prior to entering into til;- Jnlforrri
Kerti Estate Contract whereby Plaintiff purchased real property from Defendants Morris
H. Curtis and Sadie P. Curtis, did Orland
Fiandaca, President of Plaintiff corporation ;
make any representations concerning t. her
presently existing material facts?
ANS W F * :

Yh.il

If the answer to the previous uueu-u...
y**s '-nsv-U'' questions 1! through f.
(u)
• ANSWER:

s

We., c ScfJ i. epresentat iu • i- se:
Xi??

(e) Did Orland Fiandaea, at the time of
such representations, know them to be false
or make them recklessly, knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base sue
representations ?
AuSWER.

_ _YES

{d;
Were such representations made* for
the purpose of inducing Morris H. Curtis and
Sadie P. Curtis in aof' upon i:hem?
ANSWER:

YES

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter11
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(e) Did Defendants Morris H. Curtis
and Sadie P. Curtis, acting reasonably,
and in ignorance of the falsity of such
representations, in fact rely upon them?
ANSWER:

YES

(f) Were Defendants Morris H, Curtis
and Sadie P. Curtis thereby induced to act
to their injury or damage?
ANSWER:

YES

Setting aside the consideration of the existing
confidential relationship and other acts of fraud,
the jury found a specific fraudulent representation
by Fiandaca which would be controlling.
The first option agreement prepared by Fiandaca
was torn up and rescinded by the parties on January
21, 1972 (TR346).

A second option (Ex.41) was prepared

by Fiandaca in his own hand on the same day (TR346).
He secured the signatures of the Curtises by representing
the real property description contained 70 acres and the
price was set on that basis.

The description did in fact

contain 90 acres.
The jury considered the matter under Interrogatory
No. 4 (R.85):
11

INTERROGATORY NO'. 4: Do you find from
the evidence that on or before January
21, 1972 Mr. Fiandaca sought and obtained
an amendment to the previous agreement
between the parties by which amendment *
he obtained or would have obtained rights
in an additional 40 acres of land owned
by Mr. and Mrs. Curtis while failing to
disclose that fact or while representing
-
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to Defendants or allowing them to believe
Mr. Fiandaca was obtaining rights in only
an additional 20 acres of land?"
The jury answered "yes".
CONCLUSION
We submit the trial court did not error in instructing the jury concerning common law fraud or instructing
the jury separately concerning a confidential relationship.
The jury correctly found that common law fraud was
practiced upon the Curtises and did further correctly
find that a confidential relationship existed between
Orland Fiandaca, President of the 1st Ok Corporation,
and the Defendants Curtis and that Fiandaca breeched
the confidence imposed in him under that relationship.
We respectfully submit the general verdict and special
interrogatories of the jury and the findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment of the court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully

submitted,

TEX R. OLSEN
Olsen and Chamberlain
76 South Main
R i c h f i e l d , Utah 84701
Attorneys

for

Defendants-Respondents

- Hunter
23Law Library,
Digitized by the Howard W.
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of February,
A. D., 1976, two copies of the within and foregoing
Brief of Respondents, Morris H. Curtis and Sadie P,
Curtis, were served upon the following by U. S. Mail,
postage prepaid:
Mr. John H, Allen
Callister, Greene & Nebeker
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Mr. Richard A. Rappaport
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal
Suite 920 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorney for Respondents
Morris H. Curtis and Sadie
P. Curtis
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